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Abstract Credit spreads provide information about implied default probabilities
and recovery rates. Trying to extract both parameters simultaneously from market
data is challenging due to identifiability issues. We review existing default models
with stochastic recovery rates and try calibrating them to observed credit spreads.
We discuss the mechanisms of credit auctions and compare implied recoveries with
realized auction results in the example of Allied Irish Banks (AIB).
1 Introduction
Corporate credit spreads contain the market’s perception about (at least) two sources
of risk: the time of default and the subsequent loss given default, respectively, the
recovery rate. Default probabilities and recovery rates are unknown parameters—
comparable to the volatility in the Black–Scholes model. We concern the question
whether it is possible to reverse-engineer and disentangle observed credit spreads
into these ingredients. Such a reverse-engineering approach translates market values
into model parameters, comparable to the extraction of market implied volatilities
in the Black–Scholes framework. There is growing literature in the field of implied
default probabilities, whereas scientific studies on implied recoveries are sparse.
Inferring implied default probabilities from market quotes of credit instruments often
relies on the assumption of a fixed recovery rate of, say, Φ = 40 %. Subsequently,
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default probabilities are chosen such that model implied credit spreads match quoted
credit spreads. The assumption of fixing Φ = 40 % is close to the market-wide
empirical mean (compare Altman et al. [1]), but disregards recovery risk. In many
papers, the same recovery rate is assumed for all considered companies, although
empirical studies suggest that recoveries are time varying (compare Altman et al.
[2], Bruche and González-Aguado [3]), depend on the specific debt instrument, and
vary across industry sectors (compare Altman et al. [1]). Obviously, the resulting
implied default probability distribution strongly depends on the assumptions on the
recovery rate. Since default probabilities and recoveries both enter theoretical spread
formulas, we face a so-called identification problem. Making this more plastic, the
widely known approximation via the “credit triangle” (see, e.g., Spiegeleer et al.
[4, pp. 256]) suggests:
spread s = (1 − Φ)λ , (1)
where Φ is the recovery rate and λ denotes the default intensity. Obviously, for any
given market spread s, the implied recovery is a function of (the assumption on) λ
and vice versa. Using this simplified spread formula alone, it is clearly impossible to
reverse-engineer Φ and λ simultaneously from s. As we will see, this identification
problem also appears in more sophisticated credit models.
We invoke and (at least partially) answer the questions:
• Is it possible to simultaneously extract implied recovery rates and implied default
probabilities (under the risk-neutral measure Q)?
• How do implied recoveries compare to realized recoveries?1
We address the first question using two types of credit models, where neither the
recovery rate nor the default probability distribution is fixed beforehand. As opposed
to most existing approaches for the calculation of implied recoveries, both procedures
only take into account prices from simultaneously traded assets. Instead of analyzing
the spread of one credit instrument for different points in time, implied recoveries
and default probabilities are extracted from the term structure of credit spreads.
Likewise to the aforementioned implied volatility calculation, this restriction allows
for an implied recovery calibration under the risk-neutral measure Q. Analyzing the
second question, both models are exemplarily calibrated to market data of Allied
Irish Banks (AIB), who experienced a credit event in June 2011. Subsequently, real
recovery rates were revealed and can thus be compared to their implied counterparts.
In order to clarify how real recoveries are settled in today’s credit markets, we start
by introducing the mechanism of credit auctions.
1 Here, the term realized recovery does not refer to workout recoveries but to a credit auction result.
The question whether the auction procedure appropriately anticipates workout recoveries is left for
future research.
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2 CDS Settlement: Credit Auction
CDS are the most common and liquidly traded single-name credit derivatives—their
liquidity usually even exceeds the one of the underlying bond market. In case of a
credit event, the protection buyer receives a default payment, which approximates
the percentage loss of a bond holder subject to this default2 (see Schönbucher [5,
preface]). This payment is referred to as loss given default (LGD). The corresponding
recovery is defined as one minus the LGD. Recoveries are often quoted as rates, e.g.,
referring to the fraction of par the protection buyer receives, after the CDS is settled.
There are mainly three types of credit events that can be distinguished:
• Bankruptcy A bankruptcy event occurs if the company in question faces insol-
vency or bankruptcy proceedings, is dissolved (other than merger, etc.), liquidated,
or wound up.
• Failure-to-pay This occurs if the company is unable to pay back outstanding
obligations in an amount at least as large as a prespecified payment requirement.
• Restructuring A restructuring event takes place if any clause in the company’s
outstanding debt is negatively altered or violated, such that it is legally binding
for all debt holders. Not all types of CDS provide protection against restructuring
events.
These credit events are standardized by the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA). The legally binding answer to the question, whether or not a
specific credit event occurred, is given by the so-called Determinations Commit-
tees (DC).3 CDS ISDA standard contracts as well as the responsible DCs differ
among geopolitical regions. As opposed to standard European contracts, the stan-
dard North American contract does not provide protection against restructuring credit
events. The differences are originated by regulatory requirements and the absence
of a Chapter 11 equivalent: in order to provide capital relief from a balance sheet
perspective, European contracts have to incorporate restructuring events. Our focus
will be on the case of nonrestructuring credit events in what follows.
Prior to 2005, CDS were settled physically, i.e., the protection buyer received the
contractually agreed notional in exchange for defaulted bonds with the same notional.
Accordingly, the corresponding CDS recovery rate was the ratio of the bond’s market
value to its par. This procedure exhibited different shortfalls (see Haworth [6, p. 24]
or Creditex and Markit [7]):
• For a protection buyer, it was necessary to own the defaulted asset. Often, this
entailed an unnatural inflation of bond prices after default and became a substantial
2 We will use “credit event” and “default” as synonyms. Note, however, that the terms default
and credit event are sometimes distinguished in the sense that default is associated with the final
liquidation procedure.
3 More information on DCs and ISDA can be found on www.isda.org.
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problem in default events, where the notional of outstanding CDS contracts
exceeded the par of available bonds by multiples.4
• On the contrary, the protection seller was obliged to own the defaulted asset after
settlement of the CDS. Thus, she or he mandatorily retained a long position with
respect to the reference entity’s credit risk, making it less attractive to sell protec-
tion.
• Since different bonds generally may have different prices, there was no unique set-
tlement price and two identical CDS contracts often were settled against different
recoveries, depending on the liquidity of the associated bond market.
These shortfalls were the initial motivation to alter the standard settlement proce-
dure by introducing an auction-based method. From 2005 to 2013 auctions for the
settlement of CDS and LCDS (Loan Credit Default Swaps) contracts for 112 default
events were held (see Creditex and Markit [8]). On an annual basis, the number of
auctions clearly peaked after the financial crisis, i.e., in 2009, where auctions for 45
default events took place. The recovery of a standard CDS contract, traded today,
thus usually refers to the result of an auction, which is held subsequent to a credit
event.
The auction mechanism aims at a unique and fair settlement price (recovery).
It can be split into two stages: the initial bidding period and a subsequent one-
sided Dutch auction. The whole process is administrated by Creditex and Markit.
In the initial bidding period, each participant, i.e., each protection seller or buyer,
represented by one of the bigger investment banks as their dealer, submits a two-way
quote. This quote consists of a bid and an offer price for the cheapest-to-deliver bond
of the reference entity together with a one-way physical settlement request. In the
one-sided Dutch auction, the unique recovery for all outstanding CDS is assessed as
the “fair” value of the cheapest-to-deliver bond with respect to its par.5 Before the
auction starts, a quotation amount, a maximum bid-offer spread, and the cap amount
is published by ISDA. These three quantities will be explained, while passing through
the auction.
2.1 Initial Biding Period
All participants submit a two-way quote together with a one-way physical
settlement request. That quote refers to the price of the cheapest bond which is listed
as deliverable obligation by ISDA. The request must be in the same direction as the
net CDS position, e.g., participants that have net sold protection are not allowed to
request delivery of an obligation. Furthermore, the two-way quote must not violate
the maximum bid-offer spread. In case a dealer does not represent any outstand-
ing CDS positions with respect to the defaulted entity, she or he is not admitted to
4 Sometimes the phenomenon that some bonds were used several times for the settlement of CDS
is referred to as “recycling.”
5 Restructuring events differ, since they allow for maturity specific cheapest-to-deliver bonds.
Implied Recovery Rates—Auctions and Models 151
participate in the auction. Moreover, the notional of the physical settlement request
is not allowed to exceed the notional of the outstanding position.
In the next step, the so-called inside market midpoint (IMM) is calculated subject
to the following method:
1. Crossing quotes are canceled, i.e., in case an offer quote is smaller or equal to
another bid quote, the specific bid and offer are both eliminated.6
2. The so-called best halves of the remaining quotes are constructed. The best bid
half refers to the (rounded up) upper half of the remaining bid quotes. Accord-
ingly, the best offer half contains the same number of lowest non-canceled offer
quotes.
3. The IMM is defined as the average of all quotes in those best halves.
Any participant, whose bid and ask price are both violating the IMM has to pay
an adjustment amount.7 This penalty is supposed to assure that the IMM reflects
the underlying bond market in an appropriate way.8 The initial bidding period is
concluded by calculating the net open interest, i.e., the netted notional of physical
settlement requests, which is simply carried out by aggregation. In case this amount
is zero, the IMM is fixed as the auction result and consequently as the recovery for
all CDS, which were supposed to be settled via the auction. Otherwise, the IMM
serves as a benchmark for the second part of the auction procedure.
To illustrate this first step, we consider the failure-to-pay event of AIB on June
21, 2011. Two auctions were held, one for senior and one for subordinated CDS
referring to AIB. We only consider the senior auction. Table 1 displays the submitted
two-way quotes from all 14 participants. For the calculation of the IMM, the reported
bid quotes are arranged in descending order, whereas the offers start from the lowest
quote.
The first quotes from Nomura (bid) and Citigroup (offer) are canceled out, since
the corresponding bid exceeds the offer. Note that this cancelation does not entail
a settlement, both quotes are merely neglected with regard to the IMM calculation.
Therefore, 13 bid and offer quotes remain and the best halves are the seven highest bid
and lowest offer quotes, which are emphasized in Table 1. The IMM is calculated via
averaging over these quotes and rounding to one eighth, yielding an IMM of 71.375.
The maximum bid-offer spread was 2.50 %-points and the quotation amount was
EUR 2 MM. In Table 2, the corresponding physical settlement requests are reported.
As the aggregated notional from bid quotes exceeds the aggregated notional from
offer quotes, the auction type is “to buy”. Since there is netted demand for the
cheapest-to-deliver senior bond, initial offers falling below the IMM are considered
6 Note that they are not settled, but only not taken into account for the calculation of the IMM.
7 The term “violating” refers to both quotes falling below the IMM (auction is “to buy”) or exceeding
the IMM (auction is “to sell”), respectively.
8 Suppose the net open interest is “to sell”, i.e., there is a surplus on the seller side. If a participant
submits a bid exceeding the IMM, he or she is considered off-market, since prices are supposed to go
down and not up. Then the corresponding participant has to pay the prefixed quotation amount times
the difference between the IMM and his or her bid. The penalty works vice versa for off-market
offers if the open interest is “to buy”.
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Table 1 Dealer inside market quotes for the first stage of the auction of senior AIB CDS (see
Creditex and Markit [8]). Published with the kind permission of ?Creditex Group Inc. and Markit
Group Limited 2013. All rights reserved
Dealer Bid Offer Dealer
Nomura Int. PLC 72.00 70.50 Citigroup Global Markets Ltd.
Goldman Sachs Int. 71.00 71.50 Société Générale
Bank of America N.A. 70.50 72.00 Credit Suisse Int.
Barclays Bank PLC 70.50 72.00 Deutsche Bank AG
BNP Paribas 70.50 72.00 JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.
HSBC Bank PLC 70.50 72.25 Morgan Stanley &Co. Int. PLC
The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC 70.50 72.50 UBS AG
Deutsche Bank AG 70.00 73.00 Bank of America N.A.
UBS AG 70.00 73.00 Barclays Bank PLC
Morgan Stanley &Co. Int. PLC 69.75 73.00 BNP Paribas
Credit Suisse Int. 69.50 73.00 HSBC Bank PLC
JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. 69.50 73.00 The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC
Société Générale 69.00 73.50 Goldman Sachs Int.
Citigroup Global Markets Ltd. 68.00 74.50 Nomura Int. PLC
Resulting IMM 71.375
All quotes are reported in %
Table 2 Physical settlement requests for the first stage of the auction of AIB (see Creditex and
Markit [8]). Published with the kind permission of ?Creditex Group Inc. and Markit Group Limited
2013. All rights reserved
Dealer Type Size in EUR MM
BNP Paribas Offer 48.00
Credit Suisse Int. Offer 43.90
Morgan Stanley &Co. Int. PLC Offer 11.80
Barclays Bank PLC Bid 30.00
JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. Bid 52.00
Nomura Int. PLC Bid 7.75
UBS AG Bid 16,00
Total (net) “To buy” 2.05
off-market and the corresponding dealers have to pay an adjustment amount. In
Table 1, only Citigroup’s offer of 70.50 is considered off-market. The difference to
the IMM is 0.875. Using the quotation amount as notional, the resulting adjustment
amount is EUR 17, 500. The second part of the auction aims at satisfying the net
physical settlement request of EUR 2.05 MM demand.
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2.2 Dutch Auction
This second step is designed as a one-sided Dutch auction, i.e., only quotes in the
opposite direction of the net open interest are allowed. In case the net open interest is
“to sell”, dealers are only allowed to submit bid limit orders and vice versa. For the
senior CDS auction of AIB, the net physical settlement request is “to buy” and thus
only offer limit orders are allowed. As opposed to the first stage of the auction, there
is no restriction with respect to the size of the submitted orders, regardless of the
initial settlement request. In order to prevent manipulations, particularly in case of a
low net open interest, the prefixed cap amount, which is usually half of the maximum
bid-offer spread, imposes a further restriction on the possible limit orders. In case the
auction is “to sell”, orders are bounded from above by the IMM plus the cap amount
and vice versa if the net open interest is “to buy”.
In addition to these new limit orders, the appropriate side from the initial two-way
quotes from the first stage of the auction are carried over to the second stage—as
long as the order does not violate the IMM. All quotes, which are carried over, are
determined to have the same size, i.e., the prespecified quotation amount, which was
already used to assess the adjustment amount.
Now, all submitted and carried over limit orders are filled, until the net open
interest is matched. In case the auction is “to sell”, i.e., there is a surplus of bond
offerings, the bid limit orders are processed in descending order, starting from the
highest quote. Analogously, if the auction is “to buy”, offer quotes are filled, starting
from the lowest quote. The unique auction price corresponds to the last quote which
was at least partially filled. Furthermore, the result may not exceed 100 %.9
Reconsider the credit event auction for outstanding senior AIB CDS. Both, carried
over offer quotes (first) as well as offers from the second stage (second) of the auction
are reported in Table 3.
Recalling that the net physical settlement request was EUR 2.05 MM, we observe
that the first two orders were partially filled. The associated limit orders were
70.125 %, which is consequently fixed as the final auction result, i.e., all outstanding
senior CDS for AIB were settled subject to a recovery rate of 70.125 %. Following
an auction, all protection buyers, who decided to settle their contracts physically
beforehand, are obliged to deliver one of the deliverable obligations in exchange for
par. Naturally, they are interested in choosing the cheapest among all possible deliv-
erables. Thus, in case of a default, protection buyers are long a cheapest-to-delivery
option (compare, e.g., Schönbucher [5, p. 36]), enhancing the position of a protection
buyer. Details about the value of that option can be found in Haworth [6, pp.30–32]
and Jankowitsch et al. [9].
9 For Northern Rock Asset Management, the European DC resolved that a restructuring credit event
occurred on December, 15, 2011. Two auctions took place on February, 2, 2012 and the first one
theoretically would have led to an auction result of 104.25 %. Consequently, the recovery was fixed
at 100 % (compare Creditex and Markit [8]).
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Table 3 Limit orders for the senior auction of AIB (see Creditex and Markit [8]). Published with
the kind permission of ?Creditex Group Inc. and Markit Group Limited 2013. All rights reserved
Dealer Type Quote (%) Size (EUR MM) Aggregated size (USD MM)
JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. Second 70.125 2.05 2.05
Barclays Bank PLC Second 70.125 2.05 4.10
Credit Suisse Int. Second 70.25 2.05 6.15
BNP Paribas Second 70.25 1.00 7.15
BNP Paribas Second 70.375 1.05 8.20
Citigroup Global Markets Ltd. First 71.375 2.00 10.20
...
Nomura Int. PLC Second 75 2.00 42.25
2.3 Summary of the Auction Procedure
The auction-based settlement of CDS is designed to approximate the loss of the
cheapest-to-deliver bond. The term “CDS auction” might thus be misleading, since
it is an auction, where the market value of the cheapest from a set of bonds is assessed.
Consequently, the recovery rate of a CDS contract is the market value of this bond
divided by its par.
In the above example, JPMorgan’s and Barclays’ orders were the only ones filled.
Both dealers had a considerable physical settlement request of EUR 52 MM and
EUR 30 MM, respectively, possibly reflecting a long CDS position. By submitting
the lowest possible quote for a notional of EUR 2.05 MM each, both dealers stretched
the recovery to the possible maximum. In case, both parties indeed represented large
long CDS positions, they profited from the low open interest. Moreover, the final
auction result was below the IMM. Thus, if one dealer would have quoted the final
auction result already in the first step, she or he would have been considered off-
market and consequently penalized.
Another problem appeared during a restructuring credit event of SNS bank, where
senior and subordinated CDS were settled in the same auction. Due to government
intervention, subordinated bond holders experienced a full write-down (“bail-in”)
before the auction. Thus, there were no more subordinated deliverables and senior
and subordinated CDS had the very same recovery (either 95.5 or 85.5 %, depending
on the maturity of the CDS), contradicting the connection between the subordinated
bond holder’s loss and the subordinated CDS recovery. Another case for a coun-
terintuitive auction result concerned the settlement of CDS referring to Fannie Mae
or Freddy Mac, where subordinated contracts recovered above senior. Moreover, as
the determination committees and dealers are big investment banks, there might be
conflicts of interest when determining whether a credit event occurred or not.
These are reasons for an ongoing discussion about whether this one-sided auction
design is fair or not (compare Du and Zhu [10] for the proposal of an alternative
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auction design). Currently, ISDA is working on a further supplement to the credit
derivative definitions, involving among others the introduction of a new credit event
as a solution to what happened with subordinated SNS CDS.
3 Examples of Implied Recovery Models
As explained above, the recovery of a CDS, Φτ ∈ [0, 1], refers to the result of an
auction which is held after a credit event at time τ and is designed to approximate
the relative “left-over” for a bond holder. Before a default event and the following
auction takes place this recovery is unknown. One way to assess this quantity for
nondefaulted securities is to reverse-engineer implied recoveries from market CDS
quotes. Any basic pricing approach for the “fair” spread sT of a CDS with maturity
T > 0 is of the form
sT = EQ[ f (τ,Φτ )]. (2)
I.e., the spread is the risk-neutral expectation of a function of the default time (or
default probability, respectively) and the recovery rate in case of default. Specifying τ
and Φτ , two models are revisited and calibrated by minimizing the root mean squared
error (RMSE) between EQ[ f (τ,Φτ )] and market spreads over a term structure of
CDS spreads.
3.1 Cox–Ingersoll–Ross Type Reduced-Form Model
This reduced-form model resembles the one presented in Jaskowski and McAleer
[11], although applied in a different context. All reduced-form models are based
on the same principle. The time of a credit event τ is the first jump of a stochastic
counting process Z = {Zt }t≥0 ∈ N0, i.e., τ = inf {t ≥ 0 : Zt > 0}. In this case Z
will be a Cox-Process governed by a Cox–Ingersoll–Ross type intensity process λ,
i.e.,
dλt = κ(θ − λt )dt + σ
√
λt dWt , λ0 > 0.
The recovery in this model is defined as an exponential function of the intensity
process, i.e.,
Φτ := ae− 1τ
∫ τ
0 λt dt ,
where a ∈ [0, 1] is referred to as the recovery parameter. A default in a period
of high expected distress, e.g., in an economic downturn, entails lower recoveries
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Fig. 1 Weekly average spreads for AIB senior and subordinated CDS with 1 and 5 years maturity.
The spreads represent two whole term structures, which are used to calibrate the presented implied
recovery approaches in every displayed week independently
and vice versa. Comparable choices for modeling recoveries can be found, e.g., in
Madan et al. [12], Das and Hanouna [13], Höcht and Zagst [14], or Jaskowski and
McAleer [11]. Since the model will be calibrated to one CDS spread curve, one has
to be restrictive concerning the amount of free model parameters in the recovery
model. Using this model, the risk-neutral spread sT (κ, θ, σ, λ0, a) has an integral-
free representation. The resulting risk-neutral parameters and subsequently the risk-
neutral implied recovery and probability of default are determined by minimizing
the RMSE:







s MT − sT (κ, θ, σ, λ0, a)
)2
, (3)
where I is the set of maturities with observable market quotes for CDS spreads s MT .
In case senior as well as subordinated CDS are available for a certain defaultable
entity, two different recovery parameters asen and asub are used, while the intensity
parameters are the same for both seniorities. This reflects the fact that in case of a
credit event both CDS types are settled, although usually in different auctions.10 In
this case, the optimization in Eq. (3) is simply carried out by matching senior and
subordinated spreads simultaneously. For the calibration, we reconsider the exam-
ple of AIB. Figure 1 exemplarily shows weekly average quotes for AIB senior and
subordinated CDS spreads with maturities 1 and 5 years.
Approaching the time of default, a spread widening and inversion of both senior
and subordinated term structures can be observed. Calibrating the introduced Cox-
Ingersoll-Ross model to AIB CDS quotes for each week independently for several
maturities leads to the resulting implied recoveries and 5-year default probabilities
shown in Fig. 2.
10 In the current version of the upcoming ISDA supplement, subordinated CDS may also settle
without effecting senior CDS. However, so far either both or none settles.
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Fig. 2 Weekly calibration results for the CIR model applied to CDS spreads of AIB before its
default in June 2011
Implied senior and subordinated recoveries and implied default probabilities vary
substantially over time. One reason is that term structure shapes and general spread
regimes also vary unusually strong from week to week, since AIB is in distress.
Furthermore, there are co-movements of the 5-year implied default probability and
the implied recoveries. This is caused by the fact that a (recovery) and θ (long-term
default intensity) have a similar effect on long term CDS spreads. Assuming λt ≡ θ
for all t > t∗ > 0, the fair long term spread can be approximated via
sT ≈ c0 + (1 − ae−θ )θ, for all T > t∗, (4)
where c0 ∈ R is constant. Hence, using the above approximation for a given spread
sT , the optimal recovery parameter a∗ can be seen as a function of the long term
default intensity, denoted as a∗(θ). This entails the existence of a continuum of
parameter values (κ∗, θ, σ ∗, λ∗0, a∗(θ)), θ > 0, which all generate a comparable
long term spread and thus a similar RMSE. Consequently, a minor variation in the
quoted spreads might cause a substantial change in the resulting optimal parameters
and thus in the implied recovery and implied probability of default. This is referred
to as identification problem.
The following section contains a framework to circumvent this identification
problem.
3.2 Pure Recovery Model
Two CDS contracts with the same reference entity and maturity, but differently ranked
reference obligations, face the same default probabilities, but different recoveries.
The general idea of the “pure recovery model” goes back to Unal et al. [15] and
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Schläfer and Uhrig-Homburg [16]. The approach makes use of this fact by con-
sidering the fraction of two differently ranked CDS spreads, which is then free of
default probabilities. Hence, spread ratios are considered and modeled and default
probabilities can be neglected. A comparable approach is outlined in Doshi [17]. Let
ssen and ssub denote the fair spreads of two CDS contracts referring to senior and
subordinated debt. The basic idea can be illustrated using the credit triangle formula
from Eq. (1), i.e.,
ssen
ssub
≈ (1 − Φ
sen)λ
(1 − Φsub)λ =
1 − Φsen
1 − Φsub . (5)
Under simplified assumptions the ratio of two different types of CDS spreads is a
function of the recoveries Φsen and Φsub. In case of the credit triangle formula, for
instance, the underlying assumptions include independence of λ and Φ. The crucial
point is to find a suitable and sophisticated model, such that this fraction again only
contains recovery information. Implied recoveries are then extracted by calibrating
fractions of senior and subordinated spreads. We propose a model that allows for
time variation in Φ but no dependence on the default time τ .
In a first step, a company-wide recovery rate XT is defined, i.e., a recovery for
the whole company in case of a default until T, where Tmax is the maximum of all
instruments’ maturities which should be captured by the model. Suppose μ0 ∈ (0, 1),
μ1 ∈ (−1, 1), and μ0 + μ1 ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, let v ∈ (0, 1). For a certain
maturity Tmax > T > 0, XT is assumed to be Beta-distributed with the following
expectation and variance:
EQ[XT ] = μ(T ) := μ0 + μ1
√
T/Tmax, (6)
VarQ[XT ] = σ 2(T ) := v[μ(T ) − μ(T )2]. (7)
The Beta distribution is a popular choice for modeling stochastic recovery rates,
since it allows for an U-shaped density on [0, 1] that is empirically confirmed for
recovery rates. The above parameter restrictions assure that a Beta distribution with
EQ[XT ] and VarQ[XT ] as above actually exists. The square-root specification allows
for a higher differentiation between maturity specific recoveries near T = 0, a
phenomenon which is also widely reflected in CDS market term structures. Overall,
this company-wide recovery distribution varies in time without depending on τ .
In a second step, the seniority specific recoveries ΦsenT and Φ
sub
T are defined as
functions of XT. In legal terms, such a relation is established via a pecking order,
defined by the Absolute Priority Rule (APR): In case of a default event, any class
of debt with a lower priority than another will only be repaid if all higher ranked
debt is repaid in full. Furthermore, all claimants of the same seniority will recover
simultaneously, i.e., they receive the same proportion of their par value. Let dsec,
dsen, and dsub denote the proportions of secured, senior unsecured, and subordinated
unsecured debt, respectively, on the balance sheet of a company at default, such that
dsub + dsen + dsec = 1. Figure 3 illustrates the APR.
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Fig. 3 Absolute priority rule: seniority specific recoveries depend on the stochastic firm-wide
recovery and the debt structure of the company
The parameters dsub, dsen, and dsec determine, which proportion of XT is assigned
to senior and subordinated debt holders if a default occurs. Motivated by the linkage
of bonds and CDS in the auction mechanism, ΦsenT and Φ
sub
T are also assumed to
be the appropriate CDS recoveries. Note, however, that in practice, APR violations
often occur and are widely examined (see, e.g., Betker [18] and Eberhart and Weiss
[19]). Using the APR rule, a general spread representation as in Eq. (2) as well as
independence of Φ and τ , the recoveries are deterministic functions of the company-








dsen f pT ,qT (x)dx −
∫ 1
dsec+dsen f pT ,qT (x)dx
1 − ∫ 1dsec+dsen x−(dsec+dsen)dsub f pT ,qT (x)dx
, (8)
where f pT ,qT (x) denotes the density of a Beta(pT , qT )-distributed random variable.
The variables pT and qT are linked to the parameters μ0, μ1, and v via Eqs. (6)
and (7) and the first two moments of the Beta distribution. They are calibrated using
the above formula, whereas the balance sheet parameters dsec, dsen, and dsub are
directly taken from quarterly reports. Instead of calibrating a single-spread curve,
the calibration is carried out by matching theoretical fractions ssenT /ssubT (μ0, μ1, v)
in Eq. (8) for a set of several maturities to their market counterparts s M,senT /s M,subT ,
i.e.











T − ssenT /ssubT (μ0, μ1, v)
)2
.
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Fig. 4 Weekly calibration results for the pure recovery model applied to CDS spreads of AIB
before its default in June 2011
The resulting risk-neutral implied distribution of the company-wide recovery can be
translated into risk-neutral seniority specific recovery distributions by applying the
APR rule. Furthermore, we could proceed to use this implied recovery result and
extract implied default probabilities in a second step.
Calibrating the pure recovery model to senior and subordinated spreads from
AIB (see Fig. 1) before its default yields implied recoveries for senior and sub debt,
averaged over all maturities as displayed in Fig. 4.
As opposed to the Cox–Ingersoll–Ross model, the resulting recoveries do not
exhibit sudden jumps, but are more stable over time. Only during the last weeks
before default (weeks 17 to 7), particularly the subordinated recovery fluctuates.
However, this is related to the significant movements of the market spreads and not
originated by an identification problem among the parameters. Moreover, both senior
and subordinated recoveries are in line with the later auction results, at least with
respect to their proportional relation.
4 Conclusion and Outlook
Extracting implied recoveries and implied default probabilities in a risk-neutral set-
ting tends to generate instable parameter estimates. The identification problem among
long-term default probabilities and recovery rates is not limited to the presented CIR
model, but can also be observed, e.g., in jump-to-default equity models such as
the one proposed in Das and Hanouna [13]. We illustrated one way to circumvent
the problem by reducing the calibrated expression to a form, where only recovery-
related parameters appear. This is possible by considering instruments with different
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seniorities, such as senior and subordinated CDS.11 Furthermore, the extracted risk-
neutral recoveries are more in line with the observed final auction results. Generally,
further instruments, e.g., loans or the recently more popular contingent convertibles
could be used in a similar way.
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